In this inaugural Substack article, I respond to Jason Stanley’s take on the Arday affair at his own Substack, Front Left. His article is entitled: “It Sure Looks Like Jason Arday Was Horrifically Wronged.” Much has already been written on this tragic episode (see here and here); I’ll proceed on the assumption that the reader has some background familiarity with the story.
At the outset of his article, Stanley, who is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto and the former Jacob Urowsky Professor of Philosophy at Yale University, asserts that, in the days leading up to his death, “the media targeted Cambridge Sociology Professor Jason Arday.” I draw attention to the word “targeted” because this framing characterizes Arday as a person being attacked, and “the media” as an aggressor. Not all targeting is violent, nor is all aggression, but both words are suggestive of violence (e.g., a terrorist is targeted in a drone strike).
Military analogies about language are pervasive even at the most abstract levels of discourse. My favorite example in philosophy is the word “undermine,” which describes both an indirect way of arguing against a claim—roughly, by showing the source of evidence in its favor to be unreliable—and a siege tactic of digging under the walls of an enemy city to weaken its defenses.
We don’t need to deracinate all of these subtle military references from our language, but we should be cautious about when we deploy them. Characterizing speech as violence helps to launder the idea that violence is an appropriate defensive response to speech deemed harmful. Moreover, writers often apply this language selectively. For instance, they might, possibly without realizing it, describe disliked communication as “attacking” or “targeting” someone and switch to the milder “criticize” when they approve of what’s being said.
Here’s a quick consistency check for those who, like Stanley, think it’s appropriate to say that the media “targeted” Arday. Nathan Cofnas, the philosopher who exposed Arday, has also been receiving a lot of media attention, not all of it flattering, to put it mildly. Is the media targeting him, too?
(Cofnas says he’s received death threats, and circumstances make this credible. I assume that Arday also received a lot of hate mail in the last weeks of his life. Obviously, this is unacceptable. I’m comfortable with saying that individuals are “targeted” by that kind of communication. My point about targeting concerns media coverage, since this is the focus of Stanley’s article.)
With this framing established, Stanley addresses several of the major charges against Arday, starting with his fabulism. Among other fantastic claims, Arday claimed to have run 30 marathons in 35 days and to have run nine of these with an injury that caused his right leg to swell “to twice its normal size.” Stanley mentions the claim about the number of marathons run in that time, but not the injury. Perhaps he hadn’t heard that credulity-encumbering detail.
Stanley implicitly denies that making claims like this should bear heavily on our assessment of someone as a scholar. After all, he’s also skeptical of an “incredibly distinguished, highly impactful and unquestionably brilliant and accomplished leading academic friend of mine who has always insisted to me to that he could already converse decently in English with adults by the time he was three months old.” I take Stanley’s point to be that one can tell tall tales and still be an accomplished academic.
Fair enough. But note some important differences. Unless the person in Stanley’s anecdote is claiming that he can remember talking as a three-month-old, he’s getting the story from someone else, presumably his exaggerating parents. His sin, then, is excessive credulity, not lying. And whereas Arday was a serial fabricator, this person, so far as Stanley tells us, apparently tells only this single wild story.
Stanley turns to the next charge: fake credentials. An article in The Guardian notes that Arday claimed to have held a “string of prestigious visiting fellowships and professorships at other universities,” including The Ohio State University, all of which denied having employed Arday. Stanley opines:
This struck me as odd. I have taught at several peer institutions to Cambridge. I can’t imagine anyone at the institutions at which I have taught caring about whether someone held a visiting position at any of these places in considering them for a senior job…. And to describe a visiting fellowship or even a visiting professorship at Ohio State or Durham as “prestigious” – well, it’s a description only someone totally ignorant of academia would provide.
Stanley’s caviling about the word “prestigious” comes across as awfully sniffy. Not exactly the Jacob Urowsky Professor of Philosophy at Yale University, is it? But let’s press on:
Furthermore, academics get all sorts of invitations to speak at universities. If someone invites you to give (say) five lectures in a department, you are not officially “employed” by that university in a role. The department invited you to give some lectures. Sometimes, people list such things as visiting fellowships. And anyway, as I said, in the upper echelons of academia, no one cares about this kind of thing.
If it’s true that “in the upper echelons of academia, no one cares about this kind of thing,” as Stanley asserts, then this is more evidence that the elites are living by a different set of rules from the rest of us. In the middling echelons I’m familiar with, where we breathe less rarified air and sometimes eat meals that don’t include caviar, graduate students are sternly warned against listing articles still under review as “forthcoming” on their CVs because this is credential inflation. Claiming to have been employed by an institution that has never employed you, let alone several, is a graver violation of the same rule.
Even if it doesn’t matter whether Arday actually held these positions, it surely does matter whether he lied about having held them.
Stanley continues:
The only accusation that bears on the claim that wrongdoing helped Arday achieve his position of success is plagiarism, in the original sense of stealing another person’s ideas. If Arday’s work is plagiarized, then his academic success is undeserved.
Note that Arday was accused not only of plagiarism but also of falsifying research data. Stanley omits this charge entirely. Perhaps he didn’t know about it. He must surely agree that the charge is serious.
As for the plagiarism, he continues:
Plagiarism is the stealing of ideas or research programs….The original meaning of plagiarism does not cover mere overlap of sentences. If you simply copy someone else’s standard descriptions of scientific set ups, you are guilty of laziness, but not of stealing their ideas.
Our original concept of plagiarism is being stretched beyond all recognition by AI. Where there is an overlap of sentences, but no theft of ideas, most of us do not regard it as a serious charge. Even if it’s wrong, it’s certainly not an instance of the original charge of plagiarism. And as far as I can tell from the media coverage, Arday has been targeted by this kind of novel AI “overlap of sentences” method and has not been accused of stealing of ideas and research programs (which are of course serious charges).
A concession: I agree there’s a distinction between stealing ideas and stealing sentences, and that the former is worse. A professor who publishes a graduate student’s novel idea as his own does something worse than the professor who lifts a sentence without attribution. No argument there. But both are bad, just as both murder and manslaughter are bad.
Reproducing sentences isn’t trivial because a sentence is the product of intellectual labor; hence, falsely representing a sentence as your own amounts to taking credit for another’s labor. Moreover, as I’ve learned from countless rewrites, there’s no clean distinction between rephrasing and saying something new. Reword your ideas enough, and you could be surprised to find yourself saying something substantively different than when you started. So, any rule prohibiting stealing ideas must have implications for stealing sentences.
(By the way, Stanley’s narrow definition of plagiarism also excludes self-plagiarism—e.g., submitting the same work for more than one class—though this, too, is widely condemned by academic integrity codes.)
Here’s what Yale University’s Academic Honesty policy has to say on the matter:
One who borrows unacknowledged ideas or language [ATTENTION: Professor Stanley] from others is stealing their work, which denies them their due credit and also impedes that free exchange of ideas on which the university depends. Yale regards cheating as a serious offense, for which the standard penalty is two semesters of suspension.
The Yale standards clearly prohibit plagiarism of both sentences and ideas. Is it really true that “Where there is an overlap of sentences, but no theft of ideas, most of us [i.e., the academics with whom Stanley interacts] do not regard it [plagiarism] as a serious charge”? I hope it isn’t.
Having addressed charges of fake biography, inflated credentials, and plagiarism (though omitting research fraud), Stanley takes the media to task for failing to consider what he thinks is most important: citations. Stanley laments that
…not a single newspaper discussion of Arday I read commented on the impact of Arday’s academic work. This is very odd. After all, there are basic quantitative metrics – citations - that can help you quickly assess impact. And not a single reporter seems to have even checked the citations that have been made to Arday’s work.
Any journalist who investigated Arday’s citation record, Stanley goes on to say, “would quickly find that Arday’s impact is easily comparable to the leading scholars in his academic field.” Ok, but is this a good thing? Is shoddy, even fraudulent, work better if many people rely on it? If citation count is the ultimate arbiter of publication quality, then this whole system starts to look insulated and self-referential—in military slang, a “self-licking ice-cream cone.”
Stanley concedes that “fields can be faddish” (what fields, I wonder, does he have in mind, and what fads?), but dismisses critiques of citation impact as mostly self-serving defense mechanisms advanced by covetous scholars. Indeed, he concludes his essay with this speculation: “Jason Arday worked on topics that are of obvious importance to society. And his work on these topics got attention, far more than most academics, even in his fields. I suspect that this, more than anything, is what made him into such a target” (that word again).
The fact that Arday worked on topics “of obvious importance to society” doesn’t help him. If work is shoddy, then the fact that it’s about something important seems like an aggravating factor!
While Stanley encourages us to place our faith in the formalism of citation figures, we sometimes can be sure that a widely cited work is low-quality. My go-to example is Peggy MacIntosh’s “White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack,” which has, as of this writing, been cited over 7,500 times. I defy anyone to read it and tell me that its quality is commensurate with its citation count. I dare you to call it rigorous and then try to see a serious person in the mirror.
Stanley is correct about one important thing: Arday was seriously wronged, just not in the way (or by whom) he thinks. He was wronged primarily by the people who promoted him without holding him to the proper standards. He was wronged secondarily by those who were complicit in his exaltation by not reporting his malfeasance earlier. It doesn’t matter which of these things made people willing to look the other way—his race, his aesthetic, his charisma, the trendiness of his research, or some combination thereof. They did him no favors and left him holding the bag when the jig was up. The calamity was evidently too much for him to bear.
It didn’t have to be that way. Stephen Glass, a former journalist who fabricated stories in the 90s for The New Republic and other outlets, eventually moved on with his life and paid restitution to his former employers. Arday, too, could have had a second act. Tragically, his redemption arc was never realized.
[Edit 8/22/26: A reader has reasonably pressed me on whether the online pile-on constitutes a third blameworthy factor. I did mention hate mail, and it’s worth reiterating that this behavior is contemptible, even when it’s confined to non-threatening insults. The online mockery of Arday’s fabulism that I saw didn’t strike me as excessive given the facts of the case. I admit that I liked some of these posts and shared one of them.
However, there was probably crueler material circulating on the internet that I didn’t see, and the weight of all of it must have made Arday feel as though the whole world was twisting the knife. So I concede Stanley has a point here. Still, mockery, even trenchant mockery, of people in elite positions cannot be off the table in free societies. And, at least until his fall from grace, Arday was part of the elite. That’s why I continue to lay the lion’s share of the blame at the feet of those who put him there.]
[Correction: the original version of this article said that Jason Stanley currently held the title Jacob Urowsky Professor of Philosophy at Yale University, a title he no longer holds. Most references to this title have been removed.]

Decent article, but something sticks in my craw like a hangnail: I wish people would stop using this British high society euphemistic slop term "fabulist" and just talk like normal (American) people on this topic. Arday was a pathological *liar.* He told lies. Not fables, lies. "Fabulist" has been basically drafted into service just for this man and this story, and it drives me batty, especially as a writer.
The obvious rejoinder to the argument that Arday's citation count proves the importance of his work, and therefore shields his conduct: would so many have been willing to cite him had they known that there was a high chance they were citing the work of a plagiarist and fabulist who could not be trusted?